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Laws Apply at Sea, Supreme Court Rules was the Washington Post 
headline1 for a story reporting the Supreme Court’s November 13, 1922 
decision of United States v. Bowman.2  In 1922, America had not yet 
imagined a globalized world where a local Washington D.C. phone call 
might be answered in New Delhi and where the notion of Americans 
making clothes and forging steel was becoming quaint and antiquated.  
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Yet in the Bowman decision, the Court laid the groundwork for a 
twenty-first century defined by global commerce and crime without 
borders.  Today, the Bowman decision receives relatively little attention.  
When it is cited, it is often misread by lower courts.3  But as this new 
century unfolds, Bowman is likely to be seen as a central decision in the 
evolution of international criminal jurisdiction.  It is time to shine a new 
light on Bowman—a criminal procedure decision that has long been 
underrated and misunderstood. 
In Part I of this Article, we provide a description of the facts and 
holding of United States v. Bowman.  In Part II, we describe the ways in 
which lower courts have interpreted this decision.  We point to various 
cases citing Bowman and show how these courts give exceedingly broad 
application to the holding—far broader application than the opinion 
warrants.  Finally, in Part III, we discuss the ways in which the courts 
should read Bowman and demonstrate how this more accurate reading of 
the Court’s decision is consistent with the realities of twenty-first 
century global economies.  In doing so, we illustrate how Bowman 
can be a leading case for a sensible international criminal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence in a global age. 
I. THE BOWMAN DECISION 
Raymond Bowman was the chief engineer of the vessel Dio, a ship 
owned by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation 
(the Fleet Corporation) and operated by the National Shipping Corporation.4  
The United States owned all of the stock in the Fleet Corporation.5  The 
National Shipping Corporation was to bill the Fleet Corporation for fuel, 
oil, labor, and material necessary to operate the Dio.6  Bowman was accused 
of working with three other codefendants to defraud the Fleet Corporation.  
The indictment stated that these defendants hatched a plan to have the 
National Shipping Corporation bill the Fleet Corporation for one 
thousand tons of oil, while only taking delivery of six hundred tons.  The 
four defendants would then divide the excess cash produced by this 
overbilling.7
 3. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 4. Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) 
(No. 69). 
 5. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 95. 
 6. Brief for the United States, supra note 4, at 2. 
 7. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 95–96. 
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The United States government charged four defendants, including 
Raymond H. Bowman, with conspiracy to defraud8 the “United States 
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, a corporation in which 
the United States was a stockholder.”9  Three of the defendants, including 
Bowman, were United States citizens and the fourth was a British subject.  
The indictment was filed in the Southern District of New York, the 
district in which the Americans were first brought.10  The charges in the 
indictment specified that the acts occurred in several different locations, 
including on the high seas, at the port of Rio Janeiro, in the city of Rio 
Janeiro, and in its harbor.11  One defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
to one day in custody.12  Two other defendants were never tried, one 
having his bail forfeited.13  The other, a British citizen, was never arrested.14  
Raymond H. Bowman, the remaining defendant, was left to answer the 
charges levied against him.  
Bowman filed a demurrer to the six-count indictment, arguing that the 
court had no jurisdiction.15  The lower court sustained the demurrer stating 
that “[o]rdinarily . . . and prima facie, the criminal laws of the United 
States are effective only within the territory of the United States.”16  The 
district court emphasized that congressional language is necessary to 
extend “the locus of the crime to the high seas or beyond the territory of 
the United States,” and Congress did not include such language.17
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and adopted 
the government’s position that extraterritorial jurisdiction was authorized.18  
The Court began its analysis by conceding that, absent explicit language 
 8. The first three counts of the six count indictment charged conspiracy to 
defraud. The fourth count was for a fictitious claim, count five for the presentation of 
that claim, and the final count for “concealment by trick, scheme, and device of a 
material fact in the presentation of the claim.”  Brief for the United States, supra note 4, 
at 4. 
 9. Id. at 1. 
 10. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 96. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Transcript of Record at 22, Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (No. 69). 
 13. Brief for the United States, supra note 4, at 2. 
 14. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102. 
 15. Brief for the United States, supra note 4, at 5. 
 16. United States v. Bowman, 287 F. 588, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 
94 (1922). 
 17. Id. at 593 (emphasis added).  The lower court stated that “the court and not 
Congress would be writing the statute, if it gave to it the construction urged by the 
Government.”  Id. 
 18. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102–03. 




to the contrary, “[c]rimes against private individuals or their property, 
like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement 
and frauds of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the 
community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the government where it may properly exercise it.”19  But the Court 
permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction in Bowman because: 
[T]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which 
are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s 
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend 
itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed 
by its own citizens, officers, or agents.20
And individuals who commit “fraud upon the government” should be 
prosecuted irrespective of whether it is “in private and public vessels of 
the United States on the high seas and in foreign ports and beyond the 
land jurisdiction of the United States.”21  The Court limited its holding to 
some degree, emphasizing the importance of Bowman’s status as a 
United States citizen.22
The Court thus staked out a position rejecting broad extraterritorial 
application of criminal law in the absence of express congressional mandate.23  
The distinction, which is apparent from a close reading of this case, is 
between acts that affect private citizens and those acts targeted directly 
against the government.24  Although society may typically view criminal 
law as a means to regulate conduct that damages public welfare, the 
facts of Bowman—and the Court’s narrow analysis of the case—clearly 
address criminal behavior for which the government is the prime 
victim.25  The Court also clearly showed its respect for the rule of 
comity,26 which dictates that the United States should not interfere with 
 19. Id. at 98. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 102. 
 22. See id.  The Court stated that “the three defendants . . . were citizens of the 
United States, and were certainly subject to such laws as it might pass . . . .  The other 
defendant is a subject of Great Britain . . . . and it will be time enough to consider what, 
if any, jurisdiction the District Court below has to punish him when he is brought to 
trial.”  Id. at 102–03. 
 23. Id. at 98–99, 102. 
 24. Id. at 98. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 102.  The Court stated that “[c]learly it is no offense to the dignity or 
right of sovereignty of Brazil to hold them for this crime against the government to 
which they owe allegiance.” Id. 
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another country’s desire to prosecute alleged criminal conduct occurring 
within that country’s jurisdiction.27
This interpretation of Bowman fits with later Supreme Court decisions 
that invoke a presumption against extraterritorial application of criminal 
statutes unless Congress expresses a contrary intent.28  Although Bowman 
was not mentioned in the recent Supreme Court decision of Small v. 
United States,29 which held that the meaning of “convicted in any court” 
did not include foreign courts,30 the Small Court clearly stated that “Congress 
ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, 
application.”31  
In later years, however, the legacy of Bowman has not been so clear 
cut.  Bowman has been an underappreciated decision—it has been cited 
fewer than two hundred times in the case law.  Where the decision has 
been cited, courts often used it to support findings that are inconsistent 
with the analysis of the Bowman Court.32
II. THE BOWMAN LEGACY 
In the years since Bowman, and particularly in the past forty years, the 
federal government has vastly expanded its criminal enforcement 
powers.33  Congress has adopted a surfeit of new statutes.34  And 
prosecutorial offices, including various Department of Justice divisions, 
United States Attorney’s offices, and criminal enforcement divisions in 
 27. ELLEN S. PODGOR, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 7–8 
(2004).  For a discussion of the meanings and origins of comity in international law, see 
generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1991). 
 28. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993); Blackmer v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 
(1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 
Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)), as recognized in Landgraf v. USI 
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 29. 544 U.S. 385 (2005). 
 30. Id. at 394 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 388–89. 
 32. See, e.g., Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967) (using 
Bowman to support a finding of extraterritoriality); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 
136–37 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying the Bowman Court’s discussion of congressional intent 
to support a holding of extraterritoriality). 
 33. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIM. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998) (noting that “[m]ore than 40% of the federal 
criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970”). 
 34. Id. at 7–9. 




other agencies, have expanded to enforce these laws.35  One of the most 
important and wide-ranging aspects of this expansion has been in the 
area of drug enforcement.36  Because a large portion of the legal drug traffic 
starts in, and passes through, other countries, federal drug enforcement 
agencies have begun to look outside the country in their efforts to prosecute 
drug crimes.37  In more recent years, with the rise of the Internet and, more 
generally, a global economy, enforcement of other economic crimes has 
pushed beyond the national borders.38
Given this dramatic expansion in both the scope and geographic reach 
of federal prosecutions, it was hardly surprising that federal agencies 
sought the power to reach defendants outside the country—even in the 
absence of explicit congressional authorization for such conduct. 
In 1967, in Brulay v. United States,39 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
extraterritorial reach of a conspiracy statute where prosecutors charged 
the defendant with conspiring to smuggle drugs into the United States.  
In Brulay, the American defendant was arrested in Mexico for conduct 
that occurred in Mexico.40  The government introduced no evidence that 
the conspiracy was formed in the United States and provided no evidence of 
an overt act in the United States.41  Summarily dismissing the defendant’s 
challenge, the court rejected the argument that there was any need for 
express congressional authorization for extraterritorial reach.42  Instead, the 
court quoted Bowman’s critical language and argued that conspiracy to 
smuggle drugs into the country was the sort of crime “not logically 
dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are 
enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against 
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its 
own citizens, officers, or agents.”43  The court provided no additional 
 35. Id. at 14. 
 36. See U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Staffing & Budget, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/staffing.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007) (illustrating 
the staffing increases in the Drug Enforcement Administration over the past thirty-four 
years). 
 37. See United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1991) (surveying 
the different circuits that gave extraterritorial effect to a particular drug statute).  See also 
EDWARD M. WISE, ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
191–94 (2d ed. 2004). 
 38. See EDWARD M. WISE & ELLEN S. PODGOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
142–43 (2000).  
 39. 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967). 
 40. Id. at 347. 
 41. See id. at 349–51.  Although 18 U.S.C. § 371, the generic conspiracy statute, 
requires proof of an overt act, drug conspiracy statutes omit this element in the offense, 
allowing prosecutors to prove a conspiracy without presenting any evidence of an overt 
act coming from the agreement.  See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994). 
 42. Brulay, 383 F.2d at 350. 
 43. Id. (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)). 
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analysis and did not explain how a conspiracy to smuggle drugs fit into 
the category of crimes involving fraud against the United States. 
In United States v. Baker,44 the Fifth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s 
logic but offered a more explicit and expansive reading of Bowman.  In 
Baker, Abraham Baker and James Osborne were convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute marijuana.45  The two men had been operating 
an American flag vessel nine miles off the coast of Florida, which was 
outside the three-mile territorial jurisdiction of the United States.46  The 
question before the Fifth Circuit was whether the federal criminal statutes 
had extraterritorial application, and the court conceded that the statutes 
involved in Baker were silent on this point.47  The court turned to Bowman 
to determine whether to infer such extraterritorial reach.48  The Bowman 
Court started its analysis with a clear awareness that extraterritorial 
application without express authorization would not be the norm.49  
Remarkably, the Baker court began its analysis with the claim that 
“[a]bsent an express intention on the face of the statutes to do so, the 
exercise of [extraterritorial] power may be inferred from the nature of 
the offenses and Congress’ other legislative efforts to eliminate the type 
of crime involved.”50  The court then quoted extensively from the 
Bowman Court’s carefully worded holding.51  Writing for the Fifth Circuit, 
Judge Roney explained that the drug laws at issue were part of a 
comprehensive effort to halt drug abuse in the United States and “the 
power to control efforts to introduce illicit drugs into the United States 
from the high seas and foreign nations is a necessary incident to Congress’ 
efforts to eradicate all illegal drug trafficking.”52  Although the court had 
to concede that the statute was silent as to the extraterritorial application 
 44. 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 45. Id. at 136.  Baker was also convicted of conspiracy.  Id. 
 46. Id. at 135.  The boat was stopped nine miles from the coast, within what are 
sometimes known as “customs waters” or the “marginal sea.”  The United States 
conceded that this area was regarded as outside of the United States—and part of the 
high seas—for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction.  Id. at 136. 
 47. Id. at 136. 
 48. Id. at 136–37. 
 49. The Bowman Court stated, “If punishment . . . is to be extended to include 
those committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to 
say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this 
regard.”  United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
 50. Baker, 609 F.2d at 136. 
 51. Id. at 136–37. 
 52. Id. at 137. 




of the provisions at issue in Baker, it pointed to other sections of the law 
where Congress had affirmatively authorized extraterritorial reach.  For 
instance, the Court referenced 21 U.S.C. § 959, which criminalizes the 
manufacturing and distribution of a controlled substance outside the 
United States with the intent of importing it to the United States, to 
support its position that the exclusion of language providing for express 
extraterritorial authorization signified Congress’s intent to include such 
broad authorization of power.53
Thus, the Baker court transformed Bowman in three key ways: first, 
the court inverted the assumption that extraterritorial application of 
criminal law normally required express authorization; second, the court 
found such implicit authorization in a situation where Congress clearly 
demonstrated its ability to explicitly authorize such power (but equally 
clearly failed to do so with respect to the particular statute at issue); and 
third, the court joined other courts, such as the Brulay court, in extending 
the number of circumstances in which such authorization could implicitly 
be found beyond situations where the government itself was a victim to 
situations where the statute was designed to protect the public at large.  
This expansion of Bowman dramatically changed the meaning of the 
opinion and was subsequently the basis for other decisions authorizing a 
broader reach of statutes, even in the absence of express congressional 
authorization.54
The problem with these interpretations of Bowman, however, is twofold.  
First, these interpretations are not faithful to the Supreme Court’s explicit 
holding.  Second, they are deeply problematic on a policy level, particularly 
in an era of globalization where many countries may seek to enforce 
their respective interests both at home and abroad. 
III. BOWMAN AND THE “NEW WORLD ORDER” 
The Supreme Court handed down the Bowman decision in an era very 
different from today.  Still, the Court’s carefully crafted decision reflects 
the same concerns that should animate a modern understanding of the 
issue of extraterritorial reach.  The primary difference between the 1920s 
and today is that the world has become far more interconnected than ever 
before.  We are living, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, in a 
“new world order.”55
 53. Id. 
 54. See United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (listing 
cases that have allowed an extraterritorial application). 
 55. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf War Crisis and 
the Federal Budget Deficit, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1218, 1219 (Sept. 11, 1990). 
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In the past forty years, many courts have inferred broad reach to 
criminal laws even in the absence of Congressional mandate.56  There is 
little doubt that Congress maintains the capacity to create such potent 
laws.  But because the consequences of these provisions are increasingly 
far reaching—with many countries potentially seeking to extend the 
reach of their criminal laws and possibly willing to punish America for 
an extended reach—Congress should make these judgments. 
The issues are not simple and two policy rationales conflict here.  On 
one hand there is a need to make certain that individuals do not cross 
borders merely to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States.  For 
example, a Washington Post article reporting on the Bowman decision 
stated that the Court upheld the government’s position “that unless the 
ruling of the lower court was set aside the criminal statutes of the United 
States could be violated with impunity by persons going outside the 3-
mile limit.”57  Allowing perpetrators to intentionally exit the borders of 
this country to commit crimes against individuals here would defeat the 
prohibitions outlined in the statute. 
On the other hand, another policy rationale argues for limits to 
extraterritorial applications.  If the United States begins prosecuting 
individuals outside its borders because the crime merely “affects” this 
country,58 it will be advertising to other countries that they can prosecute 
United States citizens when the conduct has an effect on their respective 
country.59  Taking into account that the crimes in these other countries 
may not be crimes in the United States or may be subject to our 
constitutional protections, it becomes apparent that there are severe 
repercussions in allowing blanket extraterritoriality.  Finally, in this globalized 
and computerized world, the United States citizen who commits the 
alleged criminal act in violation of the laws of another country may 
never have left home.60  The perpetrator’s keystroke in the United States, 
 56. See Plummer, 221 F.3d at 1305 (listing cases that have allowed an extraterritorial 
application).
 57. Laws Apply at Sea, supra note 1, at 5. 
 58. This principle is called “objective territoriality.”  See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 
U.S. 280, 285 (1911); see also Aldens, Inc. v. La Follette, 552 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
 59. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Replacing 
“Objective Territoriality” With “Defensive Territoriality,” in 28 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS & 
SOCIETY 117 (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., 2003) (discussing the repercussions of 
expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 60. Former Attorney General Janet Reno stated that “[a] hacker needs no passport 
and passes no checkpoints.”  Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney Gen., Keynote Address at the 




expressing speech that the First Amendment protects, may nevertheless 
be the subject of a prosecution in a country with laws prohibiting such 
speech.61  Jurisdiction would be basically limitless if it could be met 
merely because the World Wide Web allows someone in another country 
to access via their computer materials that have been placed on the web 
in this country. 
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces—
perhaps not surprisingly a tribunal likely to express grave concern 
regarding the international implications of its decisions—confronted this 
problematic legacy of Bowman.  In United States v. Martinelli,62 the court 
considered the extraterritorial reach of the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996.  Christopher Martinelli, a member of the United States 
military, had been charged with violations of the Act that occurred in 
Darmstadt, Germany.63  He was accused of possessing, downloading, 
and emailing pornographic images of children on his computer.64  The 
court acknowledged that several courts had read Bowman to extend 
beyond cases where the American government was a victim.65  The court 
rejected this interpretation, however, concluding that while the Act was 
designed to protect children, this community protection was not the 
sort that the Bowman Court considered as a basis for inferring the 
extraterritorial reach of a criminal statute.66
Meeting of the P8 Senior Experts’ Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Jan. 21, 
1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/agfranc.htm.  One of the 
President’s working groups repeated this metaphor in its report on cybercrime.  
PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE 
INTERNET 21 (2000), available at http://www/usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm. 
 61. See German and U.S. Clash Over Efforts to Crack Down on Neo-Nazi Web 
Sites in the U.S., 17 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 63, 64 (2001) (discussing controversy 
between United States and Germany in that Germany wishes to “crack down extraterritorially 
on Neo-Nazi hate crimes,” and United States wishes to maintain individuals’ First 
Amendment rights within United States); see also Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme Et L’Antisenitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (ruling that 
Yahoo! was not subject to French laws criminalizing the auctioning of Nazi memorabilia 
when the conduct was protected by the First Amendment), cited in Ellen S. Podgor, 
International Computer Fraud: A Paradigm for Limiting National Jurisdiction, 35 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 267, 310 n.179 (2002). 
 62. 62 M.J. 52 (C.A.A.F. 2005). 
 63. Id. at 53. 
 64. Id. at 55. 
 65. Id. at 58. 
 66. Id. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Bowman provides a key distinction that few courts recognize today.67  
If the government is the target or the victim of a criminal act, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction should be permitted.  Conversely, if the target or the victim 
of the crime is beyond the government, then courts should refuse to 
permit the government to prosecute absent clear congressional language 
authorizing an extraterritorial application.  The government’s brief in the 
Bowman case clearly limits its request for relief to this scenario, as the 
authors of the brief use italics as emphasis in describing crimes as “not 
against persons and property but against the sovereignty of the United 
States and the operations of its Government.”68
So why should this case be deemed the most underrated criminal procedure 
case?  Jurisdiction is the most fundamental principle for proceeding with 
a criminal action. Without the power to investigate, prosecute, and punish 
activities, there is no criminal matter before the court. There will be no 
forum to resolve Miranda,69 Escobedo,70 or Leon71 issues if the court 
never assumes jurisdiction of the case. 
The Bowman case provides an important paradigm for determining the 
appropriate geographic boundaries for criminal matters.  It also stands at 
the entry way, the place where the criminal justice process begins.  Although 
many statutes will specify the constitutional basis for jurisdiction, many 
will omit whether extraterritorial actions are legally permissible, leaving 
the courts with the task of wrestling with this question.  Historically, 
answering this question may not have been crucial.  But when criminal 
activities move from the seas to the internet highway, jurisdiction may 
prove to be the most crucial issue that courts will need to resolve. 
 67. The misreading of the statute can be traced back to a Fifth Circuit decision, 
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980).  See Martinelli, 62 M.J. at 58 
(discussing how the roots of the misreading of the Bowman decision emanate from this 
drug-related case). 
 68. Brief for the United States, supra note 4, at 17. 
 69. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating procedure by which police 
must apprise criminal suspects of their rights and thereby mitigate interrogation’s 
inherent element of coercion). 
 70. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (defining circumstances where a 
criminal suspect can be in police custody without being under formal arrest). 
 71. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating exception to evidentiary 
exclusionary rule where police make good-faith attempt to follow constitutionally required 
procedures). 
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